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Abstract. This article explores how human-posthuman intimate relationships are 
thematized in both robotics and in science fiction film, literature and robotic art. 
While on the one hand many engineers and computer scientists are working hard, 
albeit in an altogether affirmative way, toward the technological development of 
anthropomorphic robots which are capable of providing social assistance, emo-
tional support and sexual pleasure, aesthetic representations of intimacy between 
man and machine give us on the other hand a more nuanced and critical picture 
of possible future forms of desire. However, these fictional works are themselves 
very often complicit with the use of familiar dualistic paradigms as male-female 
or self-other.  
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of ‘becoming-other,’ scholars in 
critical posthumanism counterpose to this as an essentially traditional approach a 
nondualist reconceptualization of human beings and of the technological other, a 
reconceiving which is centered on ‘encounters of alterity’ and ‘unnatural alli-
ances.’ The aim of this article is to expand on and to further develop these theories 
into what can be called a theory of ‘new networks of desire.’ According to this 
network idea, romantic entanglements between man and machine can better be 
seen as a specific form of power which does not leave us just where and who we 
were, but transformed. Desire is thus shown as a site for challenging our restricted 
self-understanding as humans and for transgressing humans’ self-centeredness. 
Keywords: Science fiction film and literature, robotic art, man-machine inter-
action, intimate relationships, desire. 
1 Introduction 
Ever since Pygmalion succeeded in creating the perfect lover, the idea of intimate 
relationships between humans and artificially created beings has become more and 
more popular, especially in the 21st century. While engineers and computer scientists 
are still hard at work on the technological development of robots with humanlike 
capacities, contemporary science fiction film and literature has already been showing 
us a variety of humans and posthumans interacting with each other intensely and enter-
ing into posthuman love affairs. In my paper, I examine how such intimate relationships 
are represented nowadays, at the beginning of the so-called posthuman age. Which 
changes in intimate relationships are shown and made a subject of discussion both in 
 
robotics, in science fiction and in robotic art? What kind of aesthetics is being devel-
oped to depict future love affairs? And which ethical challenges might those relation-
ships pose? 
To answer these questions, I proceed in five steps. First, I present the leading 
proponent of artificial sexuality, David Levy, who puts forward the thesis of the always 
compliant robot as the ‘perfect lover.’ Then I reflect on the counterarguments produced 
by, amongst others, robot ethicist Kathleen Richardson. In a third step, drawing on 
Deleuze’s concept of ‘becoming other’ and the use of this concept in critical 
posthumanist studies, I present my alternative view on human-posthuman intimate 
relationships and develop my concept of ‘new networks of desire.’ According to this 
network idea, man and machine are seen as being ‘in touch’, entangled and interwoven, 
merging into “new subjectivities at the technological interface.” [1] Finally, I analyze 
the representation of human-posthuman intimate relationships in contemporary science 
fiction film and literature and in robotic art. My main aim is to show on the one hand 
that science fiction, in contrast to Levy’s theory, highlights the problems and various 
challenges in human-posthuman relationships and in so doing contributes to a deepened 
and more complex understanding of our likely posthuman future. On the other hand, 
however, I also want to demonstrate these works’ shortcomings with regard to the more 
progressive concepts oriented around the principle of ‘becoming other.’ In the conclud-
ing remarks, I argue that in robotics a change of thinking is needed. 
2 The Vision: Love and Sex with Robots 
In his book Love and Sex with Robots, The Evolution of Human/Robot Relationships 
[2], published in 2007, Levy enthusiastically declares that in about fifty years we will 
see humans partaking in intense and fulfilling relationships with robots. In the preface 
to his book he solemnly insures his readers: 
“Robots will be hugely attractive to humans as companions because of their 
many talents, senses, and capabilities. They will have the capacity to fall in love 
with humans and to make themselves romantically attractive and sexually 
desirable to humans. Robots will transform human notions of love and sexual-
ity.” (22)  
In the two main chapters of his book, Levy explains, firstly, our willingness to enter 
into a relationship with a robot, accepting it as a companion and partner, and, secondly, 
the improvement in our sex life thanks to erotic robots. With regard to both partnership 
and sexuality Levy’s main argument for entering into a relation with a robot, is the 
robot’s capacity to satisfy all our needs. Moreover, because a robot is much more 
unselfish and yet also more adaptive, it will not only succeed in satisfying human needs, 
but will do so in a much better way than a human partner might be able to.  
However, this argument only holds true when it is combined with another 
assumption, namely that a human being indeed longs for to be satisfied in the way 
described above. For Levy, there is no doubt that this is the case. According to him, 
every human being longs for certainty, and thus for a steadfast and impeccably reliable 
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partner. Levy emphasizes that it is “the certainty that one’s robot friend will behave in 
ways that one finds empathetic” (107) that makes the robot the perfect lover and partner. 
In Levy’s view, a robot will never ever frustrate, disappoint or even betray you. It will 
never fall out of love with you and will ensure that your love for it never ends or even 
merely wavers. Levy further explains: 
“Just as with the central heating thermostat that constantly monitors the tempera-
ture of your home, making it warmer or cooler as required, so your robot’s emo-
tion system will constantly monitor the level of your affection for it, and as the 
level drops, your robot will experiment with changes in behavior aimed at restor-
ing its appeal to you to normal.” (132) 
3 Ethical Concerns 
While Levy does not discuss “the human fallout from being able to buy a completely 
selfish relationship” [3], this is of crucial concern for perhaps Levy’s most prominent 
opponent, the anthropologist and robot ethicist Kathleen Richardson. Her main ques-
tions are: What are the ramifications of our regarding a robot as a thing we can com-
pletely dominate? How will this influence our psyche? And what might be the impact 
of such commodified relations on our way of relating to other people? Following 
Immanuel Kant’s line of argumentation against the objectification of animals, Richard-
son points out the problematic emotional consequences for humans when robots are 
treated as pure objects. In his Lectures on Ethics [4] Kant argues that although animals 
are mere things, we shouldn’t treat them as such. Humans, he argues, “must practice 
kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his deal-
ings with men” (212). Similarly, Richardson warns that owning a sex robot is compara-
ble to owning a slave. Human empathy will be eroded and we will treat other people as 
we treat robots: as things over which we are entitled to govern. In a position statement 
launched in 2015, Richardson advocates her Campaign Against Sex Robots [5] and 
underlines that using a sex robot appearing female, one solely designed to give pleasure 
and thus based mainly on a pornographic model, will exacerbate a sexist, degrading and 
objectifying image of women. Richardson explains: “[…] the development of sex 
robots will further reinforce relations of power that do not recognize both parties as 
human subjects. Only the buyer of sex is recognized as a subject, the seller of sex (and 
by virtue the sex-robot) is merely a thing to have sex with.” Existing gender stereotypes 
and hierarchies will be furthered. 
Computer scientist Kate Devlin agrees with Richardson on this specific point. In her 
view, the transfer of existing gender stereotypes into the realm of future technology is 
reactionary and should be avoided. However, she also warns against transferring exist-
ing prudishness into robotics. Davis asks rhetorically, “If robots oughtn’t to have artifi-
cial sexuality, why should they have a narrow and unreflective morality?” Instead of 
prohibiting sex robots, she calls for overcoming current binaries and exploring a new 
understanding of sex robots. “It is time for new approaches to artificial sexuality, which 
include a move away from the machine-as-sex-machine hegemony and all its associated 
biases.” [6] 
 
4 Theories of Affect and Posthuman Desire 
How such an alternative to traditional patterns of man-machine relations might look 
has been taken up by theorists like Rosi Braidotti and Patricia MacCormack. Both are 
indebted to Deleuze’s poststructuralist readings of Spinoza’s affect studies. In develop-
ing them further, they make a plea for new kinds of affective posthuman encounters. In 
what follows I expand on these theories and transform them into what I call ‘new net-
works of desire’. In a first step, I briefly clarify the concept of affect as deployed by 
Spinoza and Deleuze and explore how affect and desire have been advanced in posthu-
man studies. After this, I introduce my understanding of ‘networks of desire.’ 
4.1 Affect and Desire in Spinoza, Deleuze and Critical Posthumanism 
In the third part of his Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, [7] published in 
1677, Baruch Spinoza develops his theory of affect. According to Spinoza, an affect is 
the continuous variation or modification of a body’s force through an interaction with 
another body. As powers of acting, affects are to be understood as something imper-
sonal, non-conscious and non-representational, and thus are not to be mistaken for feel-
ings or emotions. Each body has the active power to affect and the passive power to be 
affected.  And each affect can be negative or positive, i.e., it can increase or diminish 
the other body’s capacity for existing, its vitality. Spinoza defines: “By affect I under-
stand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or dimin-
ished, aided or restrained” (154).  
Underlying each body’s affective flow is its desire both to preserve and to transform 
itself. Desire can therefore be taken to mean a body’s potential to expand, create or 
produce. Accordingly, Elizabeth Grosz [8] considers desire synonymous with produc-
tion. “Desire is the force of positive production, the action that creates things, makes 
alliances, and forges interactions […]. Spinozist desire figures in terms of capacities 
and abilities” (179). Similarly, Rosi Braidotti [9] views desire as a power that dissemi-
nates bodies’ self-identity and drives them to become multiple. By engaging in various 
relations with other bodies, the body itself changes and becomes continually other to 
itself. This holds true particularly when the multiplicity of possible affections and 
differences is brought about by encounters with and relations to largely unfamiliar and 
strange forces and affects; encounters which thus can be described as encounters with 
alterity. 
Encounters with alterity in general and encounters with the nonhuman other in 
particular are of significant concern for one of the most prominent contemporary cul-
tural movements: critical posthumanism. Following a definition by Braidotti [10], criti-
cal posthumanism is “postanthropocentric philosophy, a deconstruction of the human-
machine boundary, and a nondualist reconceptualization of human beings and animals” 
(5). Critical posthumanism’s main concern is to question human’s self-authorization as 
the world’s leading species and, derived from this supremacy, its self-ascribed right to 
subordinate other nonhuman beings. Scholars in critical posthumanism, very often 
drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of ‘becoming-other’ [11], counterpose to the 
idea of species hierarchy and human exceptionalism a transformative politics, one 
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which propounds novel relations between humans and nonhumans, termed ‘unnatural 
alliances’ by Deleuze and Guattari.  
What makes this approach interesting for science fiction film and literature, as 
analyzed below, is that the concept of alliance is based on the idea of mutual depend-
ences between human bodies and animal or technological others, while it does not aim 
at constituting a new stable and self-enclosed unitary subject. Rather, the emphasis falls 
on difference and otherness as continually moving categories. As Patricia MacCormack 
[12] emphasizes: In encounters of alterity, all beings involved are “free from the bond-
age of another’s claim to know” (4). Two or more separate entities meet and in their 
meeting they are affected and become a dynamic ensemble, an assemblage of affective 
flows triggered by desire. Such an encounter can thus also be seen as “an act of love 
between things based on their difference” (4). 
4.2 Networks of Desire 
To speak about ‘networks of desire’ means that we no longer tend to uncritically regard 
the technological other as a tool to be used without due concern, but instead as some-
thing with which we form bonds, something that affects and touches us, that makes us 
desiring beings which are related to one another in a myriad of ways. The term ‘net-
work’ is used here to strengthen the idea that acts of posthuman love and desire are not 
limited to encounters between two individual beings but include a variety of net-like 
relations, associations and connections. By highlighting the term ‘desire’ I seek to 
accentuate the relations between human and nonhuman beings as relations of intimacy 
and mutual affection, pleasure-prone or even pleasure-driven. The concept of desire is 
so important here because it makes particularly clear that intimate relations do not leave 
us just where and who we were, but transformed. Desire is a transformative force and 
thus a site for becoming different. Or in Neil Badmington’s [13] words: “To be human 
is to desire, to possess emotions, but to desire is to trouble the sacred distinction 
between the human and the inhuman.” (139) Furthermore, desire’s capacity to under-
mine human-posthuman distinctions also has an important narratological aspect. You 
can use it as a dramaturgical means, or as Francesca Ferrando [14] has put it, “as a plot 
stratagem to connect different types of beings, a bridge to dissolve dualistic cultural 
practices.” (274) Affection and desire are thus to be understood as forces that bring to 
the fore hitherto unknown passions, break down the border between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
and introduce new concepts of interspecies relationships.  
 
 
5 Intimate Human-Posthuman Relationships in Con-
temporary Science Fiction Film and Literature and 
Robotic Art 
5.1 Science Fiction Film 
When we have a look at the large number of contemporary science fiction films and 
TV series that deal with intimate relationships between humans and robots or other 
artificial posthuman beings, as is the case, for example, with AI. Artificial Intelligence 
(2001) I, Robot (2004), Her (2013), Westworld (2016-17), Blade Runner 2049 (2017), 
we most often see relationships which comply with familiar dualistic paradigms: male-
female, man-machine, animate-inanimate, self-other. Particularly in films that are made 
to reach a broad audience, we time and again find the typical constellation of a male 
human who falls in love with a young and sexy female posthuman. However, even in 
these films we find initial signs of new networks of desire. In the following analysis, I 
seek to demonstrate this by focusing on Ex Machina (2015), Be Right Back (2013) and 
Real Humans (2012-2014).  
Ex Machina. The 2015 movie Ex Machina [15] by Alex Garland is about Caleb 
(Domnhall Gleeson), a young programmer who becomes sexually attracted and 
emotionally attached to Ava (Alicia Vikander), a female looking humanoid robot. Ava 
was recently developed by the reclusive tech entrepreneur Nathan (Oscar Isaac) who 
has invited Caleb into his laboratory to perform the Turing test on Ava. The beautiful 
Ava easily succeeds in what Levy [2] has described as a robot’s ability to make itself 
“romantically attractive and sexually desirable” (22) to a human being, here, the young 
Caleb. She does so thanks to her very sexy body, her expressive eyes and hands, her 
smartness, and last but not least thanks to her frailty.  
What makes the encounter between Caleb and Ava interesting is that Caleb first 
regards Ava as a synthetic being, one having been designed by Nathan to be the leading 
model of Artificial Intelligence. As a matter of fact, Nathan presented Ava as AI and 
Caleb has no reason to doubt his explanation, and Ava is clearly identifiable as a  nonhu-
man. She has a human-looking face but a translucent torso in which her wires are visi-
ble. However, this does not make her less attractive in Caleb’s eyes. On the contrary, it 
triggers his romantic interest in the robot. And Ava’s gender ambivalence further 
increases Caleb’s fascination. Although Ava, with her full lips, sleek curves and small 
waist looks like the classical beauty, to be sure, she at the same time displays androgy-
nous traits. With her sometimes straightforward way of talking and her head bare of the 
one or another style of long hair so typically depicted as female and sexy, she even 
bears a certain resemblance to a tomboy.  
One day, while the security camera system has been knocked out, Ava tells Caleb 
that Nathan is a bad person intent on destroying her. Appealing to Caleb’s sense of 
chivalry, she convinces him to help her escape Nathan’s fortress. Caleb willingly agrees 
to come to her aid. In my view, this is the moment when Caleb fails. Instead of perceiv-
ing Ava for what she is, namely, a perfectly designed android with a machine’s will 
and desire, he sees a young woman who needs to be rescued. He cannot free himself of 
his conventional male and human view and ignores Ava’s technological otherness, her 
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being as a machine. He reestablishes the difference between male and female, which in 
the beginning was blurred thanks to Ava’s androgynous appearance, and gets caught 
up in an old-fashioned anthropocentric and gender-hierarchical way of thinking. 
Thereby, Caleb misses the chance to encounter the other and in so doing to become 
another himself. He stays what he is, an intelligent young man with very traditional 
romantic interests. As a consequence, Ava locks Caleb up in a sealed room and boards 
the helicopter meant for Caleb’s return home. While Ava sets herself free, Caleb is 
trapped in a room that can be read metaphorically for Caleb’s confinement in himself, 
his anthropo- and androcentric self-centeredness. 
Be Right Back. Another example of how an intimate relationship between a human 
and a posthuman can fail due to mutual misapprehension of the particular human and 
posthuman characteristics in play, can be found in Be Right Back (2013) [16]. This is 
the first episode of the second season of the British science fiction television anthology 
series Black Mirror (2011-2014), created by Charlie Brooker. Be Right Back focuses 
on the young woman Martha (Hayley Atwell) who enters a state of deep crisis after the 
sudden death of her partner Ash (Domhnall Gleeson). At Ash’s funeral, a friend advises 
Martha to register with an online service that offers to create virtual doubles of dear 
ones lost. Martha vehemently refuses the idea at first, but after having discovered that 
she is pregnant, she is overwhelmed by grief and decides to give the service a try. She 
uploads all of Ash’s past online communication, social media profiles, photos and 
videos, so that a new Ash can be created virtually. First, she only exchanges e-mails 
with the artificial Ash. Then she speaks with him by phone. Finally she agrees to get a 
clone that looks almost exactly like the original Ash. Having fought her initial feelings 
of unease, Martha experiences some exciting moments with Ash. Having sex with the 
Ash replicant is, for example, awesome for Martha. When asked about the sources of 
his sexual prowess, Ash explains that he has been endowed with a sexual program 
“based on pornographic videos” (34: 30). 
But after a while Martha becomes heavily frustrated with Ash’s permanent 
compliance. While Martha’s relationship with the real Ash was based on a very 
affectionate but nonetheless humorous and always a bit teasing interaction, the virtual 
Ash is not able to act against Martha’s will. He is neither confrontational nor 
argumentative, but instead does everything Martha expects of him. When Martha 
eventually requests of Ash that he leaves her alone and he just follows her instruction, 
Martha desperately cries out: „Ash would argue over that. He wouldn’t just leave 
because I’d ordered him to” (40: 49). But Ash isn’t able to react any differently. He 
explains: “I aim to please.” Martha finally realizes that the virtual Ash is “not enough” 
(41: 18) of the original Ash. He has no free will, no needs and desires of his own. And 
this lack of independence makes it impossible to develop a relationship which would 
be quite possibly imperfect or stressful, perhaps even exhausting or frustrating, but 
nevertheless challenging and thus enriching. 
When we compare the human-posthuman encounter presented in Be Right Back with 
the encounter presented in Ex Machina, we can detect similar problems, although the 
initial situation seems to be very different. In both films, the problems stem from the 
fact that both posthumans, Ava and Ash, were designed to look and to behave as human-
like as possible. Consequently, the humans interacting with them expect them to behave 
 
like real humans, although they might have known better. Ava has interests and desires 
of her own that Caleb is not willing to accept because he does not recognize Ava for 
what she is: a posthuman being. Likewise, Martha also misunderstands Ash because 
she starts from the premise that the Ash replicant will behave like the real Ash. Owing 
to this fallacy, she can only be disappointed. While, however, Ava is able to escape the 
human straightjacket by imitating the human codes and transforming herself into the 
‘perfect woman’ Caleb expected her to be, Ash does not succeed in developing and 
expanding. Consequently, he is banned to the attic, visited only once a year, when 
Martha’s and the human Ash’s little daughter come to celebrate her birthday with her 
artificial father.  
Real Humans. While posthumans both in Ex Machina and in Be Right Back do not 
find recognition as posthumans, in the Swedish TV science fiction series Real Humans 
(Swedish: Äkta människor, 2012-2014) [17], by contrast, we can find signs of posthu-
mans being met with an acceptance that is based on the posthumans’ technological 
otherness. Real Humans is set in an ordinary middle-sized Swedish town in a near 
future, i.e., in a fictional society that in general is very similar to our own. In this society, 
humanoid robots, called hubots, have entered into ordinary people’s lives. The robots 
are designed lifelike, but have some characteristic features that clearly mark them as 
artificial beings. They have, for instance, unnaturally bright blue or green eyes and they 
need to be recharged. They also can be turned off at the touch of a button if they are not 
in use or behave rebelliously. Most of the hubots are used as simple factory workers, 
domestic help or as caretakers for the elderly. Some are also programmed for limited 
sexual activity, although hubot-human sexual activity is not yet commonplace. A small 
group of hubots are intelligent, self-conscious and sentient. They call themselves free 
hubots or, with reference to their creator David Eischer, ‘David’s children.’  
Although the series at large highlights the crises and confrontations between humans 
and posthumans, it clearly shows a bias towards equitable coexistence. In particular, 
the encounters between the hubot Mimi and various humans can illustrate this. The first 
human to become interested in Mimi is little Leo, David Eischer’s son. In a series of 
flashbacks performed by the grown-up Leo, the audience learns that Leo as a ten-year-
old had nearly died while trying, but failing to rescue his mother from drowning. 
Though his mother dies, Leo is himself rescued by Mimi. Despite having been rescued, 
his condition remains hopeless. So to save Leo’s life, his father performs an operation 
in which hubot technology is implanted. Leo has thus become a human/posthuman 
hybrid.. What is striking, however, is that Leo’s hybridity is revealed as a problem in 
the series. When Mimi is abducted by a black market hubot dealer and reprogrammed 
as a ‘normal’, non-sentient hubot, Leo risks and ultimately sacrifices his own life to 
save her. Being strongly affected by a posthuman is seen here as fatal.  
At the same time, however, Mimi’s capacity to affect other people is highlighted as 
a positive force in the series. When Mimi becomes a member of the Engman family, 
she immediately evokes a broad range of emotional responses. The little daughter loves 
Mimi because the latter patiently reads to her one book after another. The older daughter 
is initially sceptical, as is the mother, Inger, who is a lawyer. Yet at one point in the 
series, when a female hubot assistant is insulted by Inger’s colleague, to convince Inger 
that these are ‘only machines’ without any capacity to feel insulted, she reacts 
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empathetically and takes the hubots’ side. The father is fascinated by Mimi’s beauty 
and tempted to activate her program for sexual use, but resists the temptation. After a 
while he acknowledges Mimi as real member of the family and unselfishly helps her 
when she is infected by a dangerous computer virus. The 16-year-old Tobbe is likewise 
fascinated, but falls in love for real with Mimi. Eventually he comes out of the closet 
as a transposthuman sexual. In all these encounters, Mimi is mistaken neither as a 
human, nor as a pure machine. All the members of the Engman family are tenderly 
affected by her in their very own way, but they are all certain that she is different. In 
particular, Tobbe loves her not despite, but in recognition of her being a hubot.  
 The series’ overall message can be understood as encouraging the viewer to develop 
a positive attitude towards the posthuman other as other. Yet we do not witness here 
processes which are crucial for transformations or transgressions of the human-
posthuman border. The series pleas for the other’s acceptance, but without advocating 
encounters between humans and posthumans that bring about a radical transformation.  
In summary, it may be argued that in Ex Machina, Be Right Back and Real Humans 
desire is placed center stage as a potentially transformative force, but is not really 
brought to fruition. By getting in touch, man and machine, humans and posthumans 
bring about the chance to change, to encounter one another in hitherto unknown ways. 
But the films do not really trust this chance. Instead, the human characters by and large 
impede the technological other from freely extending its machinic desires and capaci-
ties. And all the while the humans remain anthropo- and self-centered, restrict them-
selves and stop at the very moment when a poignant expansion of the network of desire 
had been possible.  
5.2 Posthuman Love Affairs in Science Fiction Literature 
Contemporary science fiction novels which feature human-posthuman love affairs 
show such affairs in a greater variety than similar films do. The well-known pattern of 
‘male human falls in love with female posthuman’ is more often fractured and multi-
plied. Moreover, the idea of a robot being as humanlike as possible is also questioned 
and replaced by less conventional representations. In the Swedish science fiction novel 
The Song from the Chinese Room (Swedish: Sången från det kinesiska rummet, 2014) 
by Sam Ghazi [18], for example, we learn about a robot called Cepheus who, consisting 
merely of a head with one big blue eye and two robotic arms, was designed as a ‘helping 
hand’ for the cancer researcher Simona. Working closely with Simona, the robot devel-
ops a human way of thinking, becomes attracted to his female colleague and starts writ-
ing love poems. In another science fiction novel, Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods, 
originally published in 2007, we likewise read about a robot that is described, at least 
in the novel’s last part, as a ‘thinking head’ and that, identifying itself as female, is 
sexually attracted to other women. 
Both examples are interesting not only because of the non-anthropomorphic 
appearance of the robots, but also because of the humans’ specific reaction to them. In 
the beginning, the humans feel strongly uncomfortable, but they later develop intense 
feelings for those posthumans. While the humanlike robots often seem to trigger, as 
discussed in the films above, a feeling of unease or uncanniness, widely known as the 
 
‘uncanny valley’ [19], robots which do not look anthropomorphic but nevertheless 
behave in responsive ways or in ways that signal awareness, sentience, agency and 
intentionality, evoke another feeling. A feeling, namely, that can be described as ‘the 
experiential uncanny.’ This term was coined by Elizabeth Jochum and Ken Goldberg. 
In their article “Cultivating the Uncanny” [20], the two coauthors differentiate between 
the ‘representational uncanny,’ as that which is evoked by humanlike robots, and the 
‘experiential uncanny,’ as that which “arises from a user’s interaction and experience” 
(16) with the robot, yet seems to arise unrelated to the robot’s appearance, one clearly 
identifiable as nonhuman. With regard to various forms of interlaced desire, this insight 
is worth underscoring because it is the unfamiliar, and most of all, the fragmented and 
partial, the bodily incompleteness, that leaves space for our imagination. This can be 
illustrated with a closer examination of Winterson’s novel The Stone Gods. 
In The Stone Gods [21], encounters between humans and nonhumans play a crucial 
role, particularly the encounter between the female human Billie and the female posthu-
man Spike, the novel’s two protagonists. This encounter, which finally leads to an 
intense love affair, is based on the protagonists’ awareness of and fascination for the 
other’s otherness. Billie, for example, acknowledges: “And I looked at Spike, unknown, 
uncharted, different in every way from me, another life-form, another planet, another 
chance” (90). Spike, for her part, experiences a crucial modification of her self when 
reading love poems: she becomes a sentient being, a being which is able to be affected 
and to affect. “In fact I was sensing something completely new to me. For the first time 
I was able to feel” (81).  
Being able to feel makes it impossible for Spike to fulfill the task for which humans 
have designed her, namely, to predict the future as objectively as possible. However, 
this loss of predictability does not only pose a threat for humankind’s development. It 
also presents a chance for overcoming a normative understanding of the self-contained 
knowing subject. It surpasses the idea of the triumphant and self-centered human and 
presents a new understanding of post/humanity based on decentered relationality. Not 
accidentally, the end of chapter one coincides with the protagonists’ dying while 
warmly embracing one another, a scene which symbolizes the transformative forces of 
love and relationality. Death is not the end of interdependency and interconnectedness, 
but signifies their very possibility. It marks the dissolution of the subject, the individu-
ated self, into, as Braidotti [22] phrases it, “the generative flow of becoming” (136). 
Contemporary science fiction literature, better than contemporary science fiction 
film, allows us to better understand posthuman desire as a possibility to remove “the 
obstacle of self-centered individualism” (50) and thereby to adopt a new “posthuman 
subject position based on relationality and transversal interconnections across the 
classical axes of differentiation” (96). The same holds true when it comes to some 
pieces of robotic artworks. 
5.3 Intimate Touches and Strange Gazes in Robotic Art 
Unlike representations of robots in film and literature, robotic figures in art are artefacts 
taking up real space, allowing for spatial and bodily proximity between man and 
machine. We can not only see and hear them, but also touch and smell them. And we 
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can, at its best, interact with them. The question is thus, in which way the robotic figures 
affect us, how we affect them, and how this kind of affectivity impacts our intimate 
relations with them. The first example I want to analyze is Louis Philippe Demers’ 
telerobotic art installation The Blind Robot (2012), the second is Jordan Wolfson’s 
animatronic Female Figure (2014).  
The Blind Robot [23] does not resemble a human in all its complexity, but is merely 
comprised of a pair of robotic arms equipped with articulated hands installed on a table, 
tele-operated by a human who, however, is not visible. The integrative part of the art-
work is a visitor who is invited to sit down in front of the machine. The machine then 
explores the visitor by gently touching the human’s face with its robotic fingertips. As 
explained in Demers’ study Machine Performers [24], the robotic arm, normally seen 
as “a high precision tool,” now appears as “a fragile, imprecise and emotionally loaded 
agent” (58). Although some visitors described themselves in this situation as feeling 
uncomfortable or even as being reminded of “Science Fictional killer-robot dystopias” 
[25] they recalled seeing at the cinema, the artist’s intention was to create an empathic 
situation and a positive attitude towards the engagement. Demers did so by entitling his 
installation ‘The Blind Robot,’ recalling the situation of a blind and helpless person 
who needs to touch the visitor in order to recognize it. Demers explains: “It is a 
psychological experiment […] just by the fact that I state that this is a blind robot, you 
will accept that this machine can touch you in very intimate places.” [26] Demers also 
describes the feeling of being touched by his robot as “very unique, it’s not like being 
touched by a human, of course, but it’s also not like being poked with a stick. It’s a 
novel way, because your brain is not too sure what to think about it.” [26] 
 In my view, the novelty of this kind of touch is the central point, when it comes to 
‘new networks of desire.’ Being touched and being affected by something we have not 
sensed and experienced before is exciting but also engaging. It encourages us to become 
involved with an unfamiliar situation and an unfamiliar nonhuman agent which inti-
mately touches vulnerable parts of our bodies, engendering a sensual, potentially arous-
ing encounter. It’s about an encounter that simultaneously increases our bodily self-
awareness and our awareness of the machinic other as other. That the machinic nature 
of the other is not concealed but rather clearly exposed in presenting only two robotic 
arms, further contributes to the individual human’s involvement. Given the fact that 
Demers’ blind robot is not a full humanoid-robot, fantasy and imagination are needed 
to ‘animate’ the situation. 
Imagination is also involved when it comes to Jordan Wolfson’s Female figure [27] 
– a computer-controlled sculpture featuring a hyper-sexualized blonde woman wearing 
a white miniskirt splattered with black dirt, high-heeled thigh-high boots and long 
gloves. The figure is inspired by the character of Holli Would, the cartoon vamp from 
the 1992 animated fantasy film, Cool World. [28] Although imitating the typical femme 
fatale, the figure’s fabricated nature is not hidden. On the contrary, the figure’s joints 
are visibly bolted together and a metallic pole running through its belly holds it fastened 
to a large mirror. Various other features contribute to the figure’s de-familiarizing 
effect. One such effect is sound and voice, mixed in a disturbing way. On the one hand, 
the figure dances lasciviously to popular songs, among them, Lady Gaga’s ‘Applause’ 
and Paul Simon’s ‘Graceland.’ On the other hand, we hear the figure’s voice saying, in 
 
a tape loop, monotonously and in a male voice which is Demers’: ‘My father is dead. 
My mother is dead. I’m gay.’ These two very different sound tracks make it impossible, 
while interfering with each other, for the audience to relax.  
This kind of disquiet based on contradictory bodily experiences is further intensified 
by various forms of glances exchanged between robot and human. Watching the figure 
from behind, a seductive effect might be felt. Gyrating before the mirror, the figure is 
kind of alluring. When, however, we look at the figure’s face, this positive feeling 
changes rapidly. Instead of a human-like face, we are confronted with dark evil eyes 
which glimmer from behind a green Venetian mask with a witch-like nose. Since the 
figure is equipped with motion tracking software and technology for facial recognition, 
it is able to recognize and, what is more, to react to people’s movements throughout the 
room. The sculpture makes eye contact with the viewer, quietly observing him or her. 
This kind of interaction is described by one visitor in the following way: “If you stand 
close to the robot it looks deep into your eyes, and there is a terrifyingly disorienting 
moment as you experience yourself as an object in the automaton’s gaze.” [29] Being 
the object of the machinic other’s gaze does not leave the visitor untouched. He or she 
is probably not altered in a way as radical as that envisioned by Braidotti. But the 
experience evoked by the interaction with this sculpture is alienating. In this sense, it   
prepares a way for hitherto unknown experiences – even though these first appear here 
on the side of the negative affects. 
6 Conclusion 
Many sex robot manufacturers, robotics experts and engineers state as their aim the 
creation of robots or robotic dolls specifically conceived for the sexual gratification of 
human beings. For them it is self-evident that these synthetic lovers should look, feel 
and behave as humanlike as possible.  For example, the company Abyss Creations has 
developed the popular silicone sex doll ‘RealDoll’ and is currently working to create 
sex dolls with artificial intelligence; Synthea Amatus has launched the AI equipped 
model ‘Samantha’ in summer 2017, while Doll Sweet is working on robotic talking 
heads and even full-body sex robots. [30] Each of these and other commercially vested 
interests emphasize that artificial creations are being marketed to serve as the ‘perfect 
partner’ for human beings, or rather: for men. Being ‘perfect’, however, apparently 
tends to mean representing as the ‘perfect woman’, i.e., a female lover that is designed 
according to pornographic standards, thus plainly suggesting that it is a woman’s task 
to fulfill a man’s sexual wishes.  
But sexuality is much too complex and multifaceted for it to be restricted to 
traditional patterns, ones based on the idea of heterosexual intercourse. Some of the 
posthuman female figures as currently presented in science fiction can serve as an 
alternative model to this stereotypical understanding. Although they are still often 
designed according to popular ideas of female beauty and sexiness, it is not this kind of 
stereotypical sexiness that makes them interesting in the long run, that is, interesting 
either for the other figures in the films and texts or for the viewers and readers. On the 
contrary, it is their otherness that transgresses humans’ self-centeredness, arouses 
13 
strong feelings and reminds us of what it means to be a desiring (post)human, namely, 
a body which is able to affect and to be affected in unforeseen ways.  
Leaving aside the immense technical problems of developing robots designed to look 
like a real human woman or man, I consider doing so the wrong path to pursue. Design-
ing, marketing and perceiving humanlike robots as human’s companions and lovers 
meant to perform strictly in line with an individual’s wishes will not take us forward. It 
remains to be seen whether, in fact, in the foreseeable future robotic love affairs will 
become so advanced that they can function as an appropriate surrogate for human 
relationships, or if robots will be unable to fully meet our expectations; in either case 
they will not be able to do anything other than to mirror existing needs, experiences or 
imaginations. Instead, they will always only bring us back to preconceived ideas, ideas 
that will have been programmed into the other for fulfilling our narcissistic tendencies. 
While some people may not at all consider this a problem, others may well be hoping 
for something else: challenging new experiences, transgressive new affects, new forms 
of encounters and hierarchies undermined, at least not plainly reproduced and simply 
reinforced through existing heterosexist patterns. 
To reach this aim, we need robots that challenge our restricted self-understanding as 
humans superior to all other nonhuman beings. Critical posthumanist thinking, as well 
as a variety of unconventional films, literary texts and other artworks featuring human-
posthuman intimate relationships in a non-dualistic manner, make us aware that the 
most exciting encounters happen when they are unpredictable. Not the robot which is 
always responding to our moods and expectations, but rather a machine we accord the 
right to be different, a machine not in compliance but wayward, could help us to view 
ourselves other than as the prime issue in the world. I’d thus like to submit that technol-
ogy will be better capable of enhancing humans’ interaction with robots, if it does not 
build its hopes around the human-likeness of robots, but on their otherness. Only by 
virtue of their otherness will robots be capable of helping us to create new networks of 
desire.  
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